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balancing equities such as these, the court should allow the petition, using
its equitable powers thereafter to insure that any proceeds recovered inure
to the benefit of creditors.
DEFERRED POSTING UNDER THE PROPOSED
COMMERCIAL CODE
WHEN the holder of a check presents it at the drawee bank, he receives
in exchange cash or a credit to his account. Most courts consider the bank's
payment or credit final and irrevocable ' because the paying teller has
opportunity to investigate the drawer's account as to signature, amount
of funds, or notices which might stop payment of the check.2 But when the
1. Checks drawn on the bank of deposit and received over the counter, deposited by
customers or cashed for holders, are considered paid when the customer's account is
credited or when the holder receives cash. See, e.g., National Bank v. Burkhardt, 100
U.S. 686 (1879); Oddie v. National City Bank of N.Y., 45 N.Y. 735 (1871); Miller v.
Chatham Nat. Bank, 126 Misc. 559, 214 N.Y. Supp. 76 (Sup. Ct 1926). But cf. National
Gold Bank & Trust Co. v. McDonald, 51 Cal. 64 (1875) (entry of credit in depositor's
bank-book by receiving teller does not by itself amount to an acceptance of the check as
cash) ; National Loan & Exchange Bank of Columbia v. Lachovitz, 131 S.C. 432, 128 S.E.
10 (1925) (over the counter payment recovered where bank mistakenly paid after receipt
of stop-order).
2. "A check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any part of the funds to
the credit of the drawer with the bank, and the bank is not liable to the holder unless and
until it accepts or certifies the check" NwoTAxLE IxsTRuzmsn.s LAW § 189. For this
reason payment of the check may be stopped if notice is sent the drawee bank before the
bank pays the check. See pages 962-3 infra. See Burrows v. Burrows, 240 fass. 485, 137
N.E. 923 (1922) (death of drawer before presentment revokes check given as gift to
payee) ; United States Nat. Bank v. First Trust & Savings Bank, 60 Ore. 266, 119 Pac.
343 (1911) (holder denied recovery against drawee for refusing to pay after stop-order) ;
Tibby Bros. Glass Co. v. Farmers & M. Bank, 220 Pa. 1, 69 At. 280 (1903) (payee has
no claim to funds because checks do not operate as an assignment). But cf. First Nat.
Bank v. O'Byrne, 177 Ill. App. 473 (1st Dist. 1913) (check drawn for entire amount of
deposit as gift causa mortis held an assignment). Cases are collected in Note, 84 A.L.R.
412 (1933). Prior to the Negotiable Instruments Law the minority rule held that a check
was an assignment as soon as it was issued to the payee and that the payee's claim to the
funds was superior to the rights of the drawer or of those claiming against or through him.
See cases collected in Note, 5 A.L.R. 1667 (1920).
A certified check is a representation by the bank that the amount of money stated in
the body of the check will be set aside for payment upon proper indorsement. Thus, the
instrument after certification operates as an assignment. Blake v. Hamilton Dime Say.
Bank, 29 Ohio Cir. Rep. 465 (1st Cir. 1907) (drawer's stop-order ineffective). But cf.
National Reserve Bank of New York v. Corn Exchange Bank, 171 App. Div. 195, 157
N.Y. Supp. 316 (1st Dep't 1916) (certification does not warrant the genuineness of the
body of the check and payment of a raised check may be revoked). Cases are collected in
1 MoRsE, BANrs Ams BAN=G § 399 (6th ed. 1928). Where the drawer provides special
deposits to cover particular checks, they operate as an assignment. Dolph v. Cross, 153
Iowa 289, 133 NAV. 669 (1911); Gruenther v. Bank of Monroe, 90 Neb. 280, 133 NAV.
402 (1911).
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holder deposits the check in a bank other than the drawee bank, a different
rule applies. The credit which the holder obtained from the depositary
bank is not final. He usually may not draw against it I until the check
has gone through the clearing system 4 and the drawee bank has finally
credited his depositary bank with the amount. Until this time the holder
not only must forbear use of the fund,' but he is also subject to the risk that
payment will be delayed I through bank failure,7 or notices of stop pay-
3. The bank ordinarily will not permit these funds to be withdrawn until final pay-
ment is secured because of the risk that the check may be dishonored. While the cus-
tomer may be required to refund, there is always the threat that he will have insufficient
funds to cover the amount. See Kane v. First Nat. Bank of El Paso, 56 F.2d 534 (5th
Cir. 1932). To the effect that permitting withdrawals constitutes a loan from the bank
without interest charged and for arguments pro and con the advisability of banks allowing
immediate withdrawal, see Moore, Sussman & Corstvet, Drawing Against Uncollected
Checks: 1, 45 YALE L.J. 1, 16-21 (1935).
The risks which banks face when permitting their customers to draw upon uncollected
funds are not present when a large and reliable corporation is involved. Customers of
this type keep large balances in their various accounts and the risk that they will be
unable to refund the amount withdrawn if the check is dishonored, is negligible. Thus,
some large banks permit their wealthier customers to draw upon uncollected funds. But
this practice is the exception rather than the rule.
Whether withdrawal is permitted or not the bank will usually be able to charge back
the amount credited or require the customer to refund by virtue of notices printed on the
deposit slip or pass-book to the effect that the bank credits the customer's account subject
to final payment (by the drawee) and reserves the right to charge back before final pay-
ment.
For arguments in favor of permitting holders to draw immediately, see Moore, gussman
& Corstvet, supra at 17, 21.
4. After the depositary bank temporarily credits its customer, it routes the check
to the appropriate drawee bank. If the drawee is located in the same city the check will
probably be sent through the clearing house. But where the drawee is an out-of-town
bank the check will be sent either directly to it or through correspondent banks first. For
more detailed description of the clearing and collection of checks, see Leary, Dclerred
Posting and Delayed Returns-The Current Check Colleclionz Problm, 62 HRv. L. REV.
905, 907-15 (1949).
5. The delay varies with the distance between the drawee and depositary banks.
Most banks have availability schedules which are sets of rules for classifying checks with
reference to the points on which they are drawn so as to determine at what time the holder
may use the funds. The time specified is based upon the average time required for checks
to reach the drawee bank by mail and includes the time within which the drawee may
dishonor. See Moore, Sussman & Corstvet, supra note 3, at 19-21.
6. Since a check does not operate as an assignment of funds, payment of the check
may be stopped. See note 2 supra. The holder will then have to pursue the drawer on the
underlying transaction. Rarely in these circumstances will the debt be paid promptly:
(1) if the drawer stopped payment there is some dispute, or (2) if the drawer's account
was garnished by creditors, he probably will not have funds to pay the holder, or (3) if
the drawer died, the holder must settle with the estate, often a tedious procedure. If litiga-
tion ensues, the holder will encounter considerable delay in realizing any payment.
7. Where a bank fails only those owners of checks to whom the bank is obligated to
pay are protected by Federal Deposit Insurance. 12 CODE FED. R os. § 330.2 (Supp.
1946). Thus, when the drawee fails, the holder is protected by insurance only if the bank
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ment,8 garnishment, 9 or the drawer's death.1 0 Thus, the drawee bank's
irrevocable credit of the check determines the holder's risk period.
is obligated to pay, i.e., has accepted or has finally credited the check to the correspondent.
Since final payment is extended to the next day, the holder's insurance coverage is put
off that much longer. The drawee having failed before payment, credits will be reversed
by all intermediate banks or clearing houses and the holder's credit at the depositary bank
will be charged back against him.
Extending the time for securing final credits in all banks also increases the risk that
banks other than the drawee may fail, leaving the holder unprotected. See generally, Bogert,
Failed Banks, Collection Items, and Trust Preferences, 29 Micn. L. REv. 545 (1931) ;
Moore, Sussman & Corstvet, supra note 3 at 22-35; Steffen, The Check Collcetion Muddle,
10 TULANE L. REv. 537 (1936).
8. That a drawer can effectively order the drawee bank to stop payment before the
check has been accepted, certified or paid is a firmly anchored proposition. Florence
Mining Co. v. Brown, 124 U.S. 385 (1888) ; Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack, 235 Mass.
398, 126 N.E. 782 (1920) ; Miller v. Chatham Nat. Bank, 126 Misc. 559, 214 N.Y. Supp.
76 (Sup. Ct. 1926) ; Steiner v. Germantown Trust Co., 104 Pa. Super. 38, 158 At. 180
(1932). Cases are collected in 5 MicHi, BANKS AND BANKING 359 (1932) ; 1 'MAnS;
BANKS AND BANKING §§ 397-99 (6th ed. 1928). And see Moore, Sussman & Brand,
Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to Orders to Stop Payment of Cheeks-I. Legal
Method, 42 YALE L.J. 817 (1933). If the bank pays regardless of a stop-order received
before final credit or payment, it cannot recover from the holder and according to the
majority view is liable to the drawer. See Pease & Dwyer v. State Nat. Bank, 144 Tenn.
693, 88 S.W. 172 (1905). Contra: Foster v. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 113
F2d 326 (3d Cir. 1940). There is, however, a growing tendency to protect the drawee
bank if it can justify its unauthorized payment by showing that such payment discharged a
valid debt owing by the drawer to the payee. See cases discussed in Notes, 45 YAM I,..
1134 (1936) ; 40 HAv. L. Rav. 110 (1926). For an excellent analysis of the bank's posi-
tion if it disobeys the stop-order, see Comment, 39 YA L.J. 542 (1930). As to de-
positor contracts in which the drawer purports to waive his rights against the drawee for
paying a check over a stop-order, see Note, 9 OHrIo ST. L.. 543 (1948).
The holder is not remediless when payment on a check is stopped. The drawer can-
not avoid genuine liability to the holder after stopping payment. If the drawer has no
defenses, he remains liable both on the check and on the underlying transaction. See
Alchian v. MacDonald, 40 Cal. App. 505, 181 Pac. 77 (1st App. Dist. 1919) (stopping
payment does not discharge the liability of the maker to the holder); Schirm v. Wieman,
103 Aid. 541 (1906) (if the consideration for a check is legal, the drawer remains liable
to payee on the instrument after stopping payment).
9. A creditor of the drawer, who attaches the drawer's funds, has a right to those
funds superior to the holder whose check is not accepted or paid before the bank receives
notice of attachment. Wileman v. King, 120 Miss. 392, 82 So. 265 (1919); Holbrook v.
Payne, 151 Mass. 383, 24 N.E. 210 (1890). Cases are collected in Notes, 50 A.L.R. 403
(1927) ; 84 A.L.R. 412 (1933).
10. A bank's authority to pay a check is revoked by the death of the drawer and a
bank paying the check after notice of death is liable to the drawer's estate. Bridewell v.
Clay, 185 S.W.2d 170 (Te. Civ. App. 1944) ; Dixon Shoe Co. v. Moen, 203 Vis. 389,
243 N.W. 327 (1932); Sneider v. Bank of Italy, 184 Cal. 595, 194 Pac. 1021 (1920).
Where the bank pays after death but before notice, the payment is -alid. Glennan v.
Rochester Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 209 N.Y. 12, 102 N.E. 537 (1913) ; Chrzanowska -.
Corn Exchange Bank, 173 App. Div. 285, 159 N.Y. Supp. 385 (1st Dep't 1916) aff'd
without opinion, 225 N.Y. 728, 122 N.E. 877 (1919).
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- To prevent undue extension of that risk period, the pre-war bank-
ing practice required drawee banks irrevocably to credit correspondent
banks for demand items on the day of receipt." But this rule has been
substantially changed in recent years. Increased use of checks and the war
time manpower shortage sorely taxed bookkeeping departments,12 which
were required to examine and post 'a all items before the brief deadline for
final credit. Errors caused by haste were comparatively frequent. Con-
sequently, thirty-four states have enacted the American Bankers Associa-
tion's Model Deferred Posting Statute,14 which allows drawee banks
Arguments against this rule are summarized by Morse, who calls the rule a "per-
version of reason" in 1 MoRsE, BANKS AND BANKING § 400 (6th ed. 1928).
For the Uniform Commercial Code's provision with respect to drawer's death and
the bank's authority to pay, see note 20 infra.
11. Checks received for payment through the clearing house are considered condi-
tionally paid by virtue of the clearing house charge against the payor bank. See, e.g.,
Hentz v. National City Bank of N.Y., .159 App. Div. 743, 144 N.Y. Supp. 979 (1st Dep't
1913); Mount Morris Bank v. Twenty Third Ward Bank, 172 N.Y. 244, 64 N.E. 810
(1902); Leary, Deferred Posting and Delayed Returns-The Current Check Colleelo
Problem, 62 HAv. L. REv. 905, 912-14 (1949); Moore, Sussman & Corstvet, Drawing
Against Uncollected Checks: 1, 45 YALE L.J. 1, 4, 5 (1935). The conditional payment
became final at the end of the same business day, i.e., 3:00 P.M. SPAIIR, CLEAVINo AND
CoLLEe.ON OF CHEcKS 406 (1926). See, generally, Talbert, Clearing-House and Do.
inestic Exchange Functions of the Federal Reserve Banks, 4 AGAD. OF PoL. Sci. PROC. 192(1913).
Checks received for payment through the mails must be paid or dishonored within
24 hours. Usually, if retained longer without settlement, the check is considered paid.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 137. See Blackwelder v. Fergus Motor Co., 80 Mlont.
374, 260 Pac. 34 (1927); Bull v. Novice State Bank, 250 S.W. 232 (Tex. Civ. App.
1923). Cntra: Anderson Co. v. Hasha, 124 Cal. App. 23, 12 P.2d 90 (1st App. Dist.
1932) (the mere retention does not constitute acceptance). Cases are collected in Notes, 63
A:L.R. 1138 (1929) ; 68 A.L.R. 862 (1930).
12. All items received for payment through the clearing house had to be clheckcd as
to signatures and amount before the 3:00 P.M. deadline for dishonoring. Payment was
deemed final when the deadline passed. Hallenback, 'Receiver v. Leimert, Rcceiver, 295
U.S. 116 (1935); Columbia-Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Miller, 156 App. Div. 810, 142
N.Y. Supp. 440 (1st Dep't 1913) aff'd, 215 N.Y. 191, 109 N.E. 179 (1915). And if the
bank subsequently discovered a forged drawer's signature or an overdraft, it could not
recover payment from the recipient of the funds. Bank ot the United States v. Bank of
Georgia, 10 Wheat. 333 (U.S. 1825) ; Security Nat. Bank of Sioux City v. Old Nat, Bank
of Battle Creek, Mich., 241 Fed. 1 (8th Cir. 1917) ; Comment, Codification of the Ride it
Price v. Neal, 43 ILL. L, Rrv. 823 (1949). Thus, bookkeepers had only five or six hours
in which to check all items. The rush resulted in oversights, mistakes, and cmployces
missing their* regular lunch hour. For more detailed description of the resulting errors,
see Leary, supra note 11, at 911, 916, 917.
. 13. "Posting" is the mechanical banking operation in which bookkeepers debit the ac-
counts or ledgers of customers who have drawn checks upon the bank.
1 14. The American Bankers Association circulated a MoDt. DEFERR D POSTINO
STATuTE (hereinafter cited as A.B.A. MODEL STATUTE) for, adoption by the states. The
Statute was drafted by the Bank.Management Commission of the Association, with the
cooperation of a committee of attorneys of the Federal Reserve System.
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to revoke credits 15 until midnight of the business day following re-
ceipt.16 But although it has relieved the strain on hard-pressed
The status of deferred posting legislation, as of September 23, 1949, was as follovws:
1. States in which the A.B.A. MODEL STATUTE was passed in identical or very similar
form-34.-
2. States having no form of deferred posting legislation-9: Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Montana, New York, Tennessee, Washington, Vyoming, District of Columbia.
3. States having some other form of legislation not requiring credit on the day of
receipt-6: Alabama, Florida, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Virginia, Texas.
4. States where the A.B.A. MODEJL STATUTE has not been enacted:
A. Legislature still in session but bill not introduced: Alabama, District of Columbia.
B. Legislature adjourned without enactment: Florida, Massachusetts, Montana, New
York, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, Wyoming.
C. Legislature not in session this year: Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Virginia.
Communication to the YALE LAW JouRNAL from the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Washington, D.C., dated Oct. 25, 1949, in Yale Law Library. New York
has recently passed a modified deferred posting statute. N.Y. Times, April 2, 1950, § 3,
p. 1, col. 6.
Upon suggestion of the A.B.A., the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System amended its rules relating to check clearing and collection to comply with the
deferred posting practice. Regulation J, 12 CODE FED. REGs. § 2102 ct seq. (1939), as
amended effective Jan. 1, 1949. See Aninndiznts to Regulation J, 34 FED. REs. BuLL. 1472
(1948). For discussion of collection through Federal Reserve Banks, see Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond v. Early, 30 F2d 198 (4th Cir. 1929) aff'd, 281 U.S. 84 (1930).
: 15. 'In any case in which a bank receives, ... a demand item ... and gives credit
therefor before midnight of the day of receipt, the bank may have until midnight of its
next business day after receipt within which to dishonor or refuse payment of such item.
. A.BA. MODEL STATUTE § 1. "The term 'credit' includes payment, remittance, advice
of credit, or authorization to charge and, in cases where the item is received for deposit as
well as for payment, also includes the making of appropriate entries to the receiving bank's
general ledger without regard to whether the item is posted to individual customers' ledgers.
." AB.A. MODEL STATUTE § 2(b).
Tentative credit on the day of receipt appears to have been included as a concession
to the Federal Reserve Banks. They take the position that when cash items are sent to
other banks they wish to have the remittance or credit on the day of receipt, even though
"bad" items may be returned the following day. Unless this is done it will be necessary
to lengthen availability schedules, i.e., the arbitrary dates on which the banks may consider
items paid so far as having the funds available at the Federal Reserve Bank is concerned.
Several Reserve Banks have recently shortened their availability schedules for the collection
of checks drawn on banks outside their respective districts from three days to two days.
As late as 1939, the availability period, in some instances was as long as seven days. The
cut was the result of the use of air shipments and high speed sorting machines. Thus the
member banks of the Federal Reserve clearing house will have the funds of the check
available as reserve within two days, regardless of whether the check has actually been
cleared or not. But a similar cut has not been extended to the collecting bank's customers.
The depositing holder does not receive a credit which he can draw against until the check
has actually been finally credited by the drawee. N.Y. Times, Feb. S. 1950, § 3, p. 1, col. 6.
16. "Any credit so given, together with all related entries on the books of the re-
ceiving bank, may be revoked by returning the item, or if the item is held for protest or
at the time is lost or is not in the possession of the bank, by giving vnitten notice of dis-
honor, non payment, or revocation; provided that such item or notice is dispatched in the
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banks,'7 the statutory change has also extended the period of risk relation-
ship existing between a checkholder and drawer.'8
While adopting the Model Statute's deferred posting rule, the May, 1949
Draft of the proposed Uniform Commercial Code 19 recognized the in-
mails or by other expeditious means not later than midnight of the bank's next business
day after the item was received.... A bank, revoking credit pursuant to the authority of
this Act, is entitled to refund of, or credit for, the amount of the item." A.B.A. MODEL
STATUTE § 1.
The Statute limits deferred posting to demand items, of which checks are the most
common form. "A check is generally defined as a draft or order upon a bank or banking
house, purporting to be drawn upon a deposit of funds, for the payment at all events of a
certain sum of money to the order of a certain person therein named, or to him or lis
order, or to bearer, and payable on demand." Regulation J, 12 CODE FED. REcs. § 210.3
n.1 (1939) as amended effective Jan. 1, 1949. Apparently non-demand items remain sub-
ject to existing law.
The A.B.A. recognizes the essential difference, in legal treatment, between checks
drawn on the depositary bank and checks drawn on some other bank. In the former case
the Statute does not apply and existing rules still govern payment. Generally, when a
check is cashed over the counter, the transaction is considered final and irrevocable even
as to a forged drawer's signature or overdrawn account. See note 1 supra.
17. Deferred posting is directed at avoiding the cumbersome and costly practice lie-
cessitated by checking items received through the clearing house within five or six hours.
The added day permits examination and posting of items in one continuous operation and
tends toward greater efficiency and economy in bank operations.
For a detailed account of the beneficial effect of deferred posting on book-keeping
departments, see Leary, stipra note 11, at 916-17.
18. The STATUTE merely states the time limit for revoking payment, i.e., midnight of
the day after receipt. While there have been no cases directly in point subsequent to pas-
sage of the MoDEn STATUTE, the cases under the old rule (3:00 P.M. of the day of receipt)
usually held that payment is not final until the expiration of the time in which the drawee
may revoke; consequently, stop-orders received before that time were effective. See, e.g.,
Hentz v. National City Bank of New York, 159 App. Div. 743, 746, 144 N.Y. Sup. 979
(1st Dep't 1913) ; German N. Bank v. The Farmers' D. N. Bank, 119 Pa. 294, 12 AtI.
303 (1888).
Some cases have held, however, that charge to the drawer's account amounted to final
payment invalidating stop-orders received after the charge. See, e.g., Briggs v. Central
Nat. Bank of New York, 89 N.Y. 182 (1882); Albers v. Commercial Bank, 9 Mo. App.
59 (1880). But cf. Farmers Bank of Morrill v. Stapelton, 118 Kan. 755, 236 Pac. 828
(1925) (acceptance communicated to payee by telegram held sufficient to deny stop-order
despite no book-keeping entries).
Even if charge to the drawer's account is held to be determinative of the effectiveness
of stop-orders, deferred posting still extends the holder's risk period because posting
the various accounts generally takes place the following morning. See note 28 infIra.
19. AmFRICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND NAT'L CONF. OF COMxMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ART. III § 3-630 (May, 1949 Draft)
(hereinafter cited as A.L.I., COMMERCIAL CODE ART. III (May, 1949 Draft) ). The
CODE would repeal and supersede all present uniform acts and all legislation inconsistent
therewith, including the NEcGOIABiLE INSTRUMENTS LAW and any bank collection statutes.
A.L.I., COMMERCIAL CODE ART. IX, § 9-102 (May, 1949 Draft).
For general discussion of the CoDE and What it contemplates see Beers, The New
Commercial Code, 32 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 107 (1948); Gilmore, Ot the Diffliculties of




creased hardship the Statute imposes on the holder and compensated him
by giving his item priority over stop-orders and other legal notices received
by the drawee after his check has arrived. - Thus, under this proposal, if
a check reaches the drawee bank at 9:00 A.M., and a stop-order at 10:00
A.M., the check would be payable; whereas under the Model Statute the
notice would have defeated payment if received anytime before final credit
is extended at midnight of the following day. The holder's risks are thereby
diminished while banks retain the advantages of an extended posting period.
The priority theory of the Code, however, was criticized as being difficult
of administration. 2' The exact time a check is received would become para-
mount and it was said that many banks, especially those that handle a
large daily volume, could ascertain the time only with difficulty. Most
checks are received in bulk. To require marking each check when received
would be expensive because of the great number of checks handled each
day.2 2 And if individual checks are not marked, it would be necessary to
20. "[A]n item properly payable when received takes priority for payment over all
subsequently received notices, stop-orders, or legal process...." AL.I. Coip-rcmAi
CoDE ART. III § 3-629(1) (May, 1949 Draft). No provision is made for determining
priority in the situation in which the stop notice and check are received in the same mail
or night depositary receptacle. Apparently the question is left to subsequent judicial
decision.
In Comment 5 to A.L.I. Co rmmc CoDE Am. III § 3-414(5) (May, 1949 Draft)
the drafters expressly state that the reason for the priority rule is to avoid subjecting the
holder to a greater risk of attachment or other legal process as a result of the delay
occasioned by deferred posting.
Further protection is afforded the holder by § 3-416: "(1) The death of the drawer
does not revoke the authority of the drawee to pay drafts until the drawee has knowledge
of the death. (2) Even with such knowledge a bank may pay checks for ten days after
the date of death unless it is directed to stop payment of checks by some person claiming
an interest in the estate' The purpose of this section, as stated in Comment 3 thereto,
"is to permit holders of checks given shortly before death to cash them without the neces-
sity of filing a claim in probate." Since the check is normally given in immediate payment
of an obligation and will rarely be revoked, there is no justification for burdening the
holder, the executor, the court and the bank with needless formality.
21. The assistant counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York claims that the
priority provision of the May, 1949 Draft might prove difficult for banks to put into
practice. Communication to the YALE LAW Jou=rA, from the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, New York N. Y., dated Nov. 15, 1949, in Yale Law Library.
22. "A very large bank in New York City handled about 340,00D incoming cash
items in a single day, and a medium sized bank handled 148,000 incoming items. A study
of 82 small banks, scattered over 37 states, shows that even the midgets of the banking
world handle between 700 and 3,000 incoming items a day. These figures prove a fact
well known to bankers, but which has not been given as much recognition in judicial
thinking as it should, namely, that no bank handles or collects 'a check'-it handles checks
in bulk. It must do so, not only to reduce the cost of handling to a fraction of a cent
per item, but also to comply with the rules of law requiring prompt presentment. Collec-
tion of cash items is, and must be, a fast moving, streamlined, bulk handling operation."
Leary, Deferred Posting and Delayed Returns-The Current Chech Collection Problem,
62 HARv. L. REv. 905, 908-9 (1949).
1950]
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trace back anitem and determine its time of receipt from a cash sheet
identifying the group of checks with which it was received.
2 3
Probably because of this criticism, the Spring, 1950 Draft of the Com-
mercial Code alters the priority rule. Stop-orders and other legal notices
are effective under the new section until midnight of the day of receipt of
the check unless final payment or charge to the drawer's account occurs
prior to arrival of the notice.24 Hence, the exact time a cash item arrives
no longer need be determined, and the necessity for trace-back and marking
checks at time of receipt is eliminated.
In one respect, however, the priority rule remains unchanged under the
latest draft. The former provision of the Code had relieved the holder of the
risk of bank failure by extending Federal Deposit Insurance to him during
the time the check is in the hands of the drawee bank; 25 if the drawee fails
before finally crediting its corresponddnt's account, the holder at his elec-
tion 26 may consider himself a depositor of the drawee and receive coverage
up to $5000 if the..check is otherwise payable. For insurance coverage pur-
poses no. special trace-back or marking would be necessary. All instruments
in the possession of the bankrupt drawee at the time its doors were closed
would automatically -receive coverage. No administrative objection was
urged against this aspect of the priority rule and the latest Code draft
perpetuates it.27
Despite this exception which protects holders against the drawee bank's
insolvency, the compensating factor of the May, 1949 Draft remains largely
thwarted by the new provisions. The older draft extended protection to
holders when the check was received by the drawee bank. But the new rule
decreases that protection by sanctioning stop-orders and other notices until
23. Whether a stop-order or other notice is effective against a particular check usually
cannot be determined until the check is ready for posting. At this point the bookkeeper, or
some other clerk, would have to trace the item back to determine the exact time of
receipt, since the time is not marked on the check itself. The time of receipt of the stop-
order and the check must then be compared to determine which will be given effect.
24. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND NAT'L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIF01t X
STATE LAWS, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ART. III (Spring, 1950 Draft) § 4-402(3)
(hereinafter cited as A.I.I. CoMmERcIAL CODE ART. III (Spring, 1950 Draft) ).
1 25. A.L.I. COMMERcIAL. CODE ART. III § 3-629(1) (May, 1949 Draft). It is to the
drawer's benefit, as well as the holder's that the check be deemed finally paid at the
earliest possible moment so as to secure to the holder Federal Deposit Insurance in ease
the drawee fails. The holder will often prefer recovery from the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation to recourse against the drawer. The latter course involves risks such
as death and insolvency.
26. A.L.I., COMMERCIAL CODE ART. III, § 3-629(3) (May, 1949 Draft). The holder
may elect to treat the check as unpaid and pursue the drawer instead. The option will be
effective only if written notice is given the drawee and prior parties within 10 days after
the holder has received notice of the facts. In those instances where the check is over
$5,000, and thus not fully covered by Federal Deposit Insurance, this provision permits
full recovery from the drawer.
27. A.L.I. COMMERCIAL CoDE ART. III §§ 4-501(1) (4) (5) (Spring, 1950 Draft).
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midnight of the day on which the check arrives, unless a charge to the
drawer's account or final credit has been extended prior to receipt of the
notice. In reality, the latter proviso is meaningless since under deferred
posting the charge and irrevocable credit are usually made after midnight.23
Hence, in most instances, the holder's risks of stop-payment, garnishment,
and notice of drawer's death would be extended until midnight of the day of
receipt of the check-as much as an additional fifteen hours.21
Critics, moreover, probably overstate the administrative burden and
expense the priority theory would impose. Time-stamping all checks in-
dividually would, if carried out as a separate operation, cause a substantial
increase in handling expense. But checks received in bulk through a clearing
house constitute the majority of those handled daily,cO and their time of
receipt could with relative facility be indicated on the cash sheet accom-
panying such checks. Fewer checks arrive separately-over the counter or
through the mails-and only these would require individual handling. While
time-stamping of over-the-counter checks would impose an added operation
on the receiving teller, these items require individual handling in any case,
and hence the hardship would be minimal. As for mailed items, some banks
already mark their time of receipt, so that no extra expense would arise. And
instituting an incoming mall time-stamping device entails but little ad-
ditional cost.
Nor would the necessity for trace-backs give rise to inordinate expense.
Checks are traced only when the time of arrival has to be checked against
arrival of stop-orders or other notices to determine which came first.3' Only
a small percentage-less than 0.5% on a liberal estimate-of all checks re-
ceived for payment would require trace-backs. 32 Drawers do not issue stop-
28. The extension of the payment deadline wvnas instituted for the purpose of per-
mitting bookkeepers to post accounts more efficiently. This process is now accomplished
by sorting clerks, who prepare the checks for posting on the day of receipt, and by the
bookkeepers, who do the actual posting on the following morning. See Leary, Deferred
Posting and Delayed Returns-The Current Check Collcclion Problen, 62 Itmv. L Ray.
905, 917 (1949). Fxtension of irrevocable credit by the dravee bank wilt also be de-
ferred until the day after the day of receipt of the check because examination of the
drawer's account precedes payment.
29. While the MoDi STATuTE extended the holder's risk period to midnight of the
following day, and the May, 1949 draft of the CoDE shortened it to time of receipt, this
new provision would decrease the period only until midnight of the day of receipt. Thus,,
if a check arrived at the drawee banfc at 9:00 A.M., the holder's ritk perikd would re-
main fifteen hours longer than the May, 1949 Draft would have allowed.
30. See Moore, Sussman & Corstvet, Drauing Against Uncollected Chceks: I, 45
YALE L.J. 1, 17 (1935).
31. Trace-backs would not be required where checks have no notices against them
which could defeat payment. These would be handled in the regular course of business
routine. No expense is involved here since posting is a normal operation.
32. The great majority of checks are never dishonored. "In 1943 an examination of
1,489,051 items handled by 9 banks showed a total of 7,148 items returned or O.48, of
the total presented. Too Many Dishonored Itents, 60 BANEESS MONTHLY 157 (1943).
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orders indiscriminately, and garnishment is a remedy of last resort for cred-
itors. But even if the expense should prove unduly burdensome-a con-
tingency seemingly remote-the drawee bank could always avoid it. The
expense could be shifted to troublesome accounts by charging the individual
depositor for the extra service involved in death-notice, garnishment, and
stop-order trace-backs.33
Actually, the problem of the holder's risk period arises because a check is
not an assignment of funds. 4 If it were, the holder would be protected
against subsequent stop-notice, from the moment the check was issued. 5
The priority provision of the May, 1949 Draft of the Commercial Code
went a long way toward making a check an assignment by protecting the
holder from the time his check arrived at the drawee bank." Although the
check still operates as a partial assignment under the Spring, 1950 Draft, it
does so only between midnight of the day of receipt and midnight of the
following day. There is no substantial reason, however, why the holder's
protection should be diminished in this way. Admittedly, deferred posting
is necessary to promote banking efficiency, since it eliminates the haste-
created posting errors common to pre-war banking practice. But this
saving should not be made at the sole expense of check-holders.
A study of 148,560,071 items handled by one Federal Reserve Bank during 1946 disclosed
a total of only 589,818 returns or 0.40%." Leary, supra note 28, at 912 n.12.
These returned items include checks with deficiencies in signatures or overdrafts.
Thus the percentage returned because of stop-orders, garnishments, or notice of drawer's
death is actually less than represented by the percentages.
33. This practice is widely employed by many banks today. The CODE would ex-
pressly sanction such extra charge. A.L.I. COMmmCIAL CoDY AnR. III § 4-202(3)
(Spring, 1950 Draft).
34. See note 2 supra. Both drafts of the CODS adopt the non-assignment rule.
A.L.I. COMMERCIAL CODE ART. III § 3-409(1) (May, 1949 Draft); A.L.I. Co.MmERcIAL'
CODE ART. III § 3-409(1) (Spring, 1950 Draft).
35. If the assignment is completely gratuitous, Section 158 of the Restatement of
Contracts permits the assignor (drawer) to revoke the assignment. Thus payment may
be stopped. Difficulty arises, however, in that the drawee bank, upon receipt of the stop-
order, has no way of knowing if the assignment is gratuitous or for valuable consideration.
The dilemma thereby created is one of the reasons for the reluctance to consider a cheek
an assignment of funds. Pros and cons of the non-assignment rule, however, are beyond
the scope of this Note.
36. As soon as the holder's check arrived at the drawee bank, the drawer and those
claiming through him could no longer control payment. The holder had a prior right to
the funds of the drawer.
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